








April2002  1 







Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo 
 
 
March 20, 2002 





We investigate implementation in the complete information environments, where a 
social choice function is defined as a mapping from states to lotteries, and there exist 
four or more agents. We assume that for every agent, any pair of distinct states induces 
distinct strict preference orderings over all pure alternatives. In contrast to the previous 
works, we construct only direct mechanisms. Without any help of mechanism 
complexity, we can show that every social choice function is virtually implementable, 
provided that the set of states is restricted in ways that there always exist a majority of 
agents who dislike a particular agent’s dictatorial choice the worst. 
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We investigate implementation of a social choice function where there exist four or 
more agents. A social choice function is defined as a mapping from states to lotteries. 
We confine our attention to the complete information environments, in which all agents 
are assumed to know what the true state is. We restrict the set of possible states in ways 
that for every agent, any pair of distinct states induces distinct preference orderings, and 
that for every agent, any state induces a strict preference ordering over all pure 
alternatives. We assume that with the restrictions above, the set of states is inclusive 
enough. 
We consider only direct mechanisms where each agent makes a single 
announcement about the state. We use pure strategy Nash equilibrium as the solution 
concept. We require a direct mechanism to virtually implement the social choice 
function in that at every state, truth telling is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, and 
every pure strategy Nash equilibrium virtually induces the allocation that is suggested 
by the social choice function. Here, the definition of the virtualness above is originated 
by Matsushima (1988), and well cultivated by Abreu and Sen (1990). The purposes of 
the paper are to provide a sufficient condition for virtual implementation via direct 
mechanisms, and to argue that the class of social choice functions that are virtually 
implementable via direct mechanisms is large. 
A social choice function is said to be majority-proof if at every state, there exist a 
majority of agents who never prefer a particular agent’s dictatorial choice to the choice 
that is suggested by this social choice function. We show that if a social choice function 
is majority-proof, then it is virtually implementable via direct mechanisms. Based on 
this sufficiency result, we show as the main result of the paper that every social choice 
function is virtually implementable via direct mechanisms, provided that the set of 
states is restricted in ways that at every possible state, there exist a majority of agents 
who dislike a particular agent’s dictatorial choice the worst. 
Several earlier works in the implementation literature commonly indicate that it 
might be inevitable to make mechanisms complicated in order to implement a wide   3 
variety of social choice functions. See Moore (1992) and its references.
1 These works 
have constructed their respective mechanisms that are complicated in the sense that each 
agent has redundant, slack messages that she never announces as long as playing 
equilibrium behavior.
2 By announcing slack messages, each agent could deviate from 
any unwanted message profile. In contrast, direct mechanisms are simple in that they 
have no slack messages. 
Several authors such as Maskin (1999) have constructed so-called ‘modulo’ 
mechanisms, in which each agent announces not only all agents’ preferences but also an 
element of a large enough subset of integers. By combining the modulo mechanism 
design with the virtualness, Matsushima (1988), and Abreu and Sen (1990), showed that 
every social choice function is virtually implementable in pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium.
3 
Modulo mechanisms are complicated because all messages with the announcements 
of integers except ‘0’ are slack. Since such complexity is a serious obstacle to 
implement a social choice function for practical reasons, we must need an alternative 
possibility result by using only simple mechanisms such as direct mechanisms. The 
present paper implies that in a class of environments, the idea of virtualness alone is 
enough for eliminating all unwanted pure strategy equilibria, and therefore, we need to 
ask no help to the use of slack messages. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides the model. Section 3 
provides the sufficiency theorem and its corollaries. Section 4 provides the complete 
proof of the sufficiency theorem. Section 5 concludes. 
 
                                                 
1  Most papers in this literature assumed that a state is defined as a profile of agents’ preferences. 
Hence, the domain of a social choice function is restricted in ways that any pair of distinct states 
induces distinct preference profiles. 
2 Jackson (1992) discussed that it might be plausible for a mechanism implementing a social 
choice function to be bounded in some sense. Our simplicity is more restrictive than the 
boundedness, because a bounded mechanism may have slack messages. 
3 In the modulo mechanisms constructed by Matsushima (1988), every agent never announces 
the other agents’ preferences except her two neighbors’ preferences.   4 
2. The Model 
 
 
Let  ,  ,   and   denote the finite set of agents, the finite set of 
states, the finite set of pure alternatives and the set of lotteries over  , respectively, 
where we assume 
} ,..., 1 { n N = Ω A ∆
A
4 ≥ n . 
Agent   preference over lotteries is given by u  and satisfies the 
expected utility hypothesis. A social choice function is defined by a mapping from 
states to lotteries  , where its range is denoted by  . When  , 
we will simply denote  . 
is ' R i → Ω × ∆ :
) ( f ∆ ∆ → Ω : f
f ) (ω
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We provide two assumptions on the profile of utility functions   as  follows.  N i i u ∈ ) (
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Assumption 1 implies that for every agent  , any pair of distinct states induces 
distinct preference orderings over  . Hence, by knowing a single agent’s preference 




Assumption 2: For every  , and every  ,  N i∈ Ω ∈ ω
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Assumption 2 implies that for every agent  , every state induces strict 
preference ordering over all pure alternatives. 
N i∈
We define a direct mechanism by   where   is the set of agent   
messages,  , and  . When all agents announce the message 
profile  , the central planner chooses the lottery  . The honest message rule 
for each agent    is defined by   where 
) , ( g M
∆
Ω →
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m
ω ω µ= ) ( i  for  all ω .  Ω ∈
We denote   and  . A direct mechanism   will be 
simply denoted by  . For every  ,   defines a game. A message profile 
  is said to be a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium in   if 
N i i ∈ = ) (µ µ
g
N i i ∈ = )) ( ( ) ( ω µ ω µ
Ω ∈ ω , ( ω g
) , ( g M
)
M m∈ ) , ( ω g
) ), / ( ( ) ), ( ( ω ω i i i m m g u m g u ′ ≥  for  all i  and  all  .  N ∈ i i M m ∈ ′  5 
A social choice function    is said to be virtually implementable if for every  , 
there exists a direct mechanism   such that for every  , there exists a Nash 
equilibrium in ( , and for every Nash equilibrium m  in  ,   is 
close to )  in  that 
f ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ ε
) (m g
ε




) , ( ω
ε g
− ε ( f
ε ω
ε ≤ − ) )( ( ) )( ( a f a m g  for  all a .  A ∈
We define agent 1’s dictatorial social choice function   by  A d → Ω :
) , ( ) ), ( ( 1 1 ω ω ω a u d u ≥  for  all ω  and  all  .  Ω ∈ A a∈
At every state ω , agent 1 prefers   the best among  . The following 
assumption on    is likely to hold when the set of states is inclusive enough. 
Ω ∈
d
) (ω d A
 
Assumption 3: For every  , there exist ωΩ  and ω  such 
that 
Ω ∈ ω } /{ω ∈ ′ } , /{ ω ω ′ Ω ∈ ′ ′
) ( ) ( ) ( ω ω ω ′ ′ = ′ = d d d . 
 
Assumption 3 implies that for every  , there exist at least three distinct states 
at which agent 1 prefers   the  best. 
Ω ∈ ω
) (ω d
   6 
3. The Results 
 
 
A social choice function    is said to be majority-proof if for every  ,  f Ω ∈ ω
2
)} ), ( ( ) ), ( ( | } 1 /{ { #
n
d u f u N i i i > ≥ ∈ω ω ω ω . 
Hence, at every state  , there exist a majority of agents who never prefer agent 1’s 
dictatorial choice   to the socially desired choice  . The following theorem 
states that majority-proofness is sufficient for virtual implementation via direct 
mechanisms. 
Ω ∈ ω
) ω ( d ) (ω f
 




In order to prove Theorem 1, we will construct the following direct mechanism. Fix 
a message profile   arbitrarily. With a small probability, each agent   is 
randomly chosen as a constrained dictator and the central planner chooses l . 
Otherwise, the central planner chooses as follows. Fix two distinct states   and 
 arbitrarily. The central planner chooses   if a majority of agents 
except agent 1 announce  . She chooses   if all agents announce either   or 
, agent 1 announces  , and the number of agents announcing   is almost as large 
as the number of agents announcing  . She chooses    if there exist three agents 
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Let   denote the correct state. It is straightforward from the specification 
above that the honest message profile   is a strict Nash equilibrium and virtually 
induces  . Whenever a majority of agents except agent 1 announce the same but 
incorrect state, there exists an agent who does not tell the truth but has incentive to tell 
the truth. From Assumption 3, it follows that whenever there exists no opinion about the 
state that a majority of agents except agent 1 commonly announce, agent 1 can make the 
outcome virtually equal   by changing her message approximately. From the 
majority-proofness, it follows that whenever the central planner chooses  , a 
majority of agents have incentive to announce  , and therefore, the message profile 
will be eventually switched into a message profile that virtually induces  . Based 
on the outline above, we can prove that a majority-proof social choice function is 
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We provide the main result of the paper as a corollary of Theorem 1, which provides 
a restriction on the profile of utility functions   that guarantees every social 
choice function to be virtually implementable. 
N i i u ∈ ) (
 
Corollary 2: Suppose that for every  ,  Ω ∈ ω
2
} ) ), ( ( ) , ( | } 1 /{ { #
n
A a all for d u a u N i i i > ∈ ≥ ∈ω ω ω . 
Then, every social choice function is virtually implementable. 
 
Proof: From the supposition, it follows that every social choice function is 
majority-proof. Theorem 1 implies that it is virtually implementable. 
Q.E.D. 
 
Corollary 2 states that every social choice function is virtually implementable, 
provided that the set of states is restricted in ways that at every possible state, there exist 
a majority of agents who dislike agent 1’s dictatorial choice the worst. 
Fix a social choice function   arbitrarily. We specify another social choice 
function    in ways that for every  , 
f
ω
* f Ω ∈
) ( ) (
* ω ω f f =  if 
2
)} ), ( ( ) ), ( ( | } 1 /{ { #
n
d u f u N i i i > ≥ ∈ω ω ω ω , 
and 
) ( ) (
* ω ω d f =  otherwise. 
The definition of   implies that at every state ω , if a majority of agents prefer 
 to  , then   must be replaced with  . The following Corollary 
states that this modified social choice function    is virtually implementable. 
* f
) (ω d ) (ω f ) (ω f ) (ω d
* f
 
Corollary 3: For every social choice function  , its modified social choice function 




Proof: It follows from the definition of   that   is majority-proof. Theorem 1 
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4. Proof of Theorem 1 
 
 
For every ω , and every  Ω ∈ } ,..., 1 { A k ∈ , let γ  denote the pure 
alternative that agent    prefers in the k-th place among  . We define   by 
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We will prove Theorem 1 by showing that for every  , and every  , the 
honest message profile   is a Nash equilibrium in  , and that for every 
  that is close enough to zero, every  , and every Nash equilibrium   in 
, it follows that 
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Case 1: There exists   such  that  ω ~
) ~ , (m n > ω . 
 
Case 2: There exist   and ωΩ  such  that  ∈ ω ~ } ~ /{ ˆ ω ∈
, ~ { ω ω ∈ i m  for  all i ,  N ∈
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Case 3: The message profile    does not belong to either of Case 1 and Case 2.  m
 
Fix   arbitrarily, which is close enough to zero. Fix   
arbitrarily, where  . Assume that    is a Nash equilibrium in  . 
) 1 , 0 )} ( /{ ω µ M m∈
) , ( ω
ε g ) ( ) ( ω f m x ≠ m
Suppose that   belongs to Case 1. Then, it follows that  , and every agent 
 who  announces    has strict incentive to announce   instead  of  , 








) ~ ( ) ( )) ( / ( ω ω µ f m x m x i = = , 
and therefore, 
0 )} ( ) ( { ) ), ( ( ) )), ( / ( ( > + = − i i i i i i m l l
n
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ε
ω ω ω µ
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Note that there exists an agent   such that  ,   belongs to either 
Case 1 or Case 2, and 
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This agent has strict incentive to announce   instead  of  , because  ) (ω µi i m
0 )} ~ ( ) ( { ) ), ( ( ) )), ( / ( ( > + = −ω ω
ε
ω ω ω µ
ε ε
i i i i i l l
n
m g u m g u . 
However, this contradicts the Nash equilibrium property. Hence, it follows that   
cannot belong to Case 1. 
m
Suppose that    belongs to Case 2. Then, agent 1 has strict incentive to announce a 
message   satisfying   instead  of  , because   
belongs to Case 3, 
m
~ ,ω} { 1 ω ∉ ′ m ) ( ) ( 1 ω d m d = ′ 1 m 1 /m m ′
) ( ) / ( 1 ω d m m x = ′ , 
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ε
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n
, 
where Assumption 3 implies that such    exists. this contradicts the Nash equilibrium 
property. Hence, it follows that    cannot belong to Case 2. 
1 m′
m
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1 ) , ( ≥ ω m n  for  all ω∈ .  } ˆ , ~ { ω ω
If  , then agent 1 has strict incentive to announce a message   
satisfying   instead  of  , because    belongs to Case 3, 
, and therefore, it follows from Assumption 2 and the fact that 
  is close to zero that 
) ( ) ( 1 ω d m d ≠
) ( 1 m d ′
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ε
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n
. 
However, this contradicts the Nash equilibrium property. Hence, it must hold that 




m n < ω
i m
, then it follows from inequality   that there exists 
an agent   such that   and   belongs to Case 3. Such an agent 
has strict incentive to announce   instead  of  , because 
4 ≥ n
N i∈ ω ≠
( µi
) ( / ω µi m
) ω i m
) ( ) ( )) ( / ( ω ω µ d m x m x i = = , 
and therefore, 
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m n = ω
} 1 /{ N i∈
. Since   is majority-proof, it follows that there exists an agent 
 who announces   and never prefers   to  . Such an agent 
has strict incentive to announce   instead of  , because   belongs to 
Case 1, 
f
ω ≠ i m
µi
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. 
However, this contradicts the Nash equilibrium property. Hence, it follows that   
cannot belong to Case 3. 
m
From the above arguments, we have proved that for every Nash equilibrium   
in  ,  , and therefore,   is  close to  . Hence, we 
have completed the proof of the Theorem. 
M m∈
) , ( ω
ε g ) ( ) ( ω f m x = ) (m g
ε − ε ) (ω f
Q.E.D.               
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5. Concluding Remarks 
 
 
The present paper has investigated implementation of a social choice function as a 
mapping from states to lotteries. We have shown that with some domain-restrictions, 
majority-proofness is sufficient for virtual implementation in pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium via direct mechanisms. We have shown also that whenever there always 
exist a majority of agents who dislike a particular agent’s dictatorial choice the worst, 
then every social choice function is virtually implementable in pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium via direct mechanisms. 
The paper did not check whether there exists unwanted mixed strategy Nash 
equilibria. Abreu and Matsushima (1992) showed that every social choice function 
might be virtually implementable in mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, when we can 
construct so-called Abreu-Matsushima mechanisms, which are more complicated than 
direct mechanisms. In the Abreu-Matsushima mechanisms, each agent makes multiple 
announcements about the state, and the message profile that induces every agent to 
make multiple honest announcements is the unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
4 
This positive result crucially depends on the assumption that each agent can be 
individually levied by a small amount. In contrast, the preset paper does not depend on 
this assumption. 
The recent works by the author such as Matsushima (2002a, 2002b) are closely 
related, because both considered direct mechanisms or its variant in the implementation 
literature. Matsushima (2002b) investigated a particular class of direct mechanisms 
named virtual plurality mechanisms. A virtual plurality mechanism is defined on the 
basis of a plausible decision making procedure in that with a high probability the central 
planner enforces the allocation that the social choice function assigns to the opinion 
announced by a largest number of agents. Matsushima (2002b) showed that with three 
or more agents and some domain-restrictions, a social choice function is virtually 
implementable via virtual plurality mechanisms if and only if it always enforces the 
Condorcet winner. In contrast, the present paper showed that when we take into account 
a wider class of direct mechanisms than virtual plurality mechanisms, much wider 
variety of social choice functions, including inefficient ones, are all virtually 
implementable.
5 
                                                 
4  More precisely, this message profile is the unique iteratively undominated strategy profile. 
5  However, the characterization of Matsushima (2002b) does not depend on the assumption that 
there exists four or more agents.   13 
Moreover, Matsushima (2002a) investigated much simpler mechanisms than direct 
mechanisms, named local direct mechanisms, in which each agent makes only a single 
announcement about her own and two neighbors’ preferences. It must be noted that a 
social choice function is unlikely to be virtually implementable in pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium when we consider local direct mechanisms instead of direct mechanisms. 
However, Matsushima (2002a) showed that with a very minor restriction, every social 
choice function could be virtually implementable, provided that every agent is assumed 
to be boundedly rational in a naïve sense that she may announce any best reply, 
including disequilibrium messages. This result does not depend on Assumptions 1, 2 
and 3 in the present paper, but depends on the assumption that each agent can be 
individually levied by a small amount. 
   14 
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